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Abstract
In epistemic logic, some axioms dealing with the notion of knowledge
are rather convoluted and difficult to interpret intuitively, even though
some of them, such as the axioms .2 and .3, are considered to be key axioms
by some epistemic logicians. We show that they can be characterized in
terms of understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief
or knowledge and conditional belief. In order to show it, we first sketch a
theory dealing with the characterization of axioms in terms of interaction
axioms in modal logic. We then apply the main results and methods of
this theory to obtain specific results related to epistemic and doxastic
logics.
Keywords: Modal Logic, Epistemic logic, Interaction Axiom, Definability
of Modalities.
1 Introduction
One of the goals of modern epistemic logic is to elucidate the nature of the
interaction between knowledge and belief by means of formal and logical meth-
ods. On the basis of a semantics very close to the Kripke semantics of modal
logic, Hintikka [18] and subsequent philosophers and logicians tried to formu-
late explicit principles governing and relating expressions of the form “a knows
that ϕ” (subsequently formalized as Kϕ) and “a believes that ϕ” (subsequently
formalized as Bϕ), where a is a human agent and ϕ is a proposition. In other
words, they sought to determine ‘the’ logic of knowledge and belief, or at least of
idealized versions of these notions. Their quest was grounded in the observation
that our intuitions about these epistemic notions comply with some systematic
reasoning properties, and was driven by the attempt to better understand and
elucidate them [24, p. 15]. For example, the interaction axioms Kϕ→ Bϕ and
∗A short version of this article appears in [2]. This short version only deals with axioms .2
and .4 and does not deal with conditional beliefs.
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Bϕ → KBϕ are often considered to be intuitive principles: if agent a knows
ϕ then (s)he also believes ϕ, and if agent a believes ϕ, then (s)he knows that
(s)he believes ϕ. As a matter of fact, assessing whether a given principle holds
true or not raises our own awareness of these epistemic notions and reveals to
us some of their essential properties.
In computer science, the logic of knowledge is usually considered to be S5,
which is obtained by adding to the minimal normal modal logic K the axioms
Kϕ → ϕ (T), Kϕ → KKϕ (4) and ¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ (5). This last axiom 5 is
falsified in a situation where the agent has mistaken beliefs. For this very reason,
it has been attacked by various philosophers because it cannot hold in general:
agents sometimes have mistaken beliefs.1 Dropping this axiom 5 from S5, we
obtain the logic S4. Between the logics S4 and S5, a rich variety of weaker logics
of knowledge have been proposed and examined by epistemic logicians [25], such
as S4.2, S4.3 and S4.4. Even if these logics are characterized by axioms which are
rather intricate, some of them have been proclaimed by some epistemic logicians
as key axioms characterizing the notion of knowledge. For example, Lenzen
claimed that “[t]here is strong evidence in favor of the assumption that S4.2 is
the logic of knowledge” [25, p. 33], where the axiom .2 is ¬K¬Kϕ→ K¬K¬ϕ.
Likewise, Kutschera argues for S4.4 as the logic of knowledge, where the axiom
.4 is (ϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ) → Kϕ [21]. As one can easily observe, it is difficult to
provide these axioms with a natural and easily understandable reading. In fact,
Lenzen derived his axiom .2 from a set of interaction axioms relating knowledge
and belief (viewed as some sort of conviction). Similarly, the logic S4.3 is the
logic S4 to which is added the axiom .3: ¬K¬ϕ∧¬K¬ψ → ¬K¬(ϕ∧¬K¬ψ)∨
¬K¬(ϕ∧ψ)∨¬K¬(ψ∧¬K¬ϕ). Again, as one can easily notice, it is difficult to
provide this axiom with a natural and easily understandable reading. Stalnaker
argues that a certain “defeasibility theory” of knowledge gives S4.3 [32, p.190].
To better grasp the intuitions underlying these intricate axioms .2, .3 and
.4, we show that they can be characterized equivalently in terms of interaction
axioms relating knowledge and belief or knowledge and conditional belief. In
order to do so, we first need to explain what we mean by “interaction axiom”
and what we mean by “characterizing an axiom in terms of interaction axioms”.
This will lead us to develop a basic theory in modal logic dealing with these
notions. Then, we will apply the general results of this theory to the specific
case of epistemic logic. Note that such a theory has never been developed in the
modal logic literature, neither in the context of multi-modal logics nor in the
context of combinations of modal logics such as products and fusion [26, 14].
This article is divided in two parts: a “theoretical” part (Section 2) which
presents our basic theory dealing with the characterization of axioms in terms of
1For example, assume that a university lecturer believes (is certain) that one of her col-
league’s seminars is on Thursday (formally Bp). She is actually wrong because it is on Tuesday
(¬p). Therefore, she does not know that her colleague’s seminar is on Tuesday (¬Kp). If we
assume that axiom 5 is valid then we should conclude that she knows that she does not know
that her colleague’s seminar is on Tuesday (K¬Kp) (and therefore she also believes that she
does not know it: B¬Kp). This is obviously counterintuitive. More generally, axiom 5 is inval-
idated when the agent has mistaken beliefs which can be due for example to misperceptions,
lies or other forms of deception.
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interaction axioms, and an “applicative” part (Sections 3, 4, 5, 6) where we apply
some of the results of Section 2 to epistemic and doxastic logics. These logics
are recalled in Section 3. The interaction axioms introduced in the literature
are discussed in Section 4 and our main results related to epistemic logic are in
Sections 5 and 6.
Note. The missing proofs of propositions and theorems can be found in the
appendix.
2 Towards a Theory of Interaction Axioms
In this section, we start by recalling the basics of modal logic (Section 2.1).
Then, we present our basic meta-theory of modal logic dealing with interaction
axioms. Firstly, we define what we mean by “interaction axiom” and what we
mean by “characterizing an axiom in terms of interaction axiom” (Section 2.2).
Secondly, we give general results which provide some necessary and sufficient
conditions for an axiom to be characterized by a set of interaction axioms when
one of the modalities is defined in terms of the other modality (Section 2.3).
2.1 Modal Logic
In this subsection, we recall the basics of modal logic. The semantics we consider
for modal logic is the standard Kripke semantics.
2.1.1 Syntax
In the rest of the article, P is a set of propositional letters and A ⊆ {1, 2}, with
P and A non-empty. We define the modal language LA by the following BNF
grammar:
LA : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | [i]ϕ
where p ranges over P and i ranges over A. The formula > is an abbreviation
for p ∨ ¬p (for some fixed p ∈ P), the formula ⊥ is an abbreviation for ¬>,
ϕ ∨ ψ an abbreviation for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ → ψ an abbreviation for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,
and 〈i〉ϕ an abbreviation for ¬ [i]¬ϕ. An occurrence of a proposition letter p
is a positive occurrence if it is in the scope of an even number of negation signs
¬. A formula ϕ is positive in p if all occurrences of p in ϕ are positive. If
Γ := {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ LA, then
∧
Γ is an abbreviation for ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn.
A (modal) logic L for the modal language LA is a set of formulas of LA called
theorems which contains all propositional tautologies and which is closed under
modus ponens, that is, if ϕ ∈ L and ϕ → ψ ∈ L, then ψ ∈ L, and closed under
uniform substitution, that is, if ϕ belongs to L then so do all of its substitution
instances (see [7, Def. 1.18] for the definition of a substitution instance).
A modal logic is usually defined by a set of inference rules and of formulas
called axioms. A formula is a theorem of the modal logic if it can be derived
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by successively applying (some of) the inference rules to (some of) the axioms.
We are interested here in normal modal logics. These modal logics contain the
axiom schema ([i] (ϕ→ ψ)∧[i]ϕ)→ [i]ψ, and the inference rule of necessitation:
from ϕ ∈ L, infer [i]ϕ ∈ L, for all i ∈ A. Let A ⊆ LA. A modal logic for LA
generated by the set A is the smallest normal modal logic for LA containing A.
In that case, the formulas of A are called axioms. The smallest of all normal
modal logics for LA is denoted K.
If L and L′ are two sets of formulas of LA (possibly logics), we denote by
L+L′ the modal logic for LA generated by L∪L′ (it is very similar to the fusion
of L and L′ [26, 14]). If x is a formula of LA, then L+x abusively denotes L+{x}.
Note that L+ L′ may be different from L∪ L′ in general, because L∪ L′ may not
be closed under modus ponens or uniform substitution.
Let x ∈ LA and let X,X ′ ⊆ LA. We say that x is derivable from X in L
when x ∈ L+X and in that case we write X `L x. We also write X `L X ′ when
X `L x′ for all x′ ∈ X ′, and X >L X ′ when it holds that X `L X ′ but it does
not hold that X ′ `L X.
2.1.2 Kripke Semantics.
The Kripke semantics will be used only in the proof of Theorem 1. A (bi-modal)
Kripke model M is a tupleM = (W,R1, R2, V ) where W is a non-empty set of
possible worlds, R1, R2 ∈ 2W×W are binary relations over W called accessibility
relations, and V : P→ 2W is called a valuation and assigns to each propositional
letter p ∈ P a subset of W . A Kripke frame F is a Kripke model without a
valuation. We often denote by Ri(w) the set Ri(w) := {v ∈W | wRiv} and we
abusively write w ∈ M when w ∈ W . In that case, (M, w) is called a pointed
Kripke model and we denote by K the set of all pointed Kripke models.
Let ϕ ∈ LA, let M be a Kripke model and let w ∈ M. The satisfaction
relation M, w |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ϕ′
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= [i]ϕ iff for all v ∈ Ri(w),M, v |= ϕ.
If Γ ⊆ LA, then we write M, w |= Γ when M, w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. Likewise, if
F = (W,R1, R2) is an epistemic-doxastic frame, then we abusively write w ∈ F
for w ∈ W . We also write Γ |= ϕ when for all (M, w) ∈ K, M, w |= Γ implies
thatM, w |= ϕ. If Γ is a set of formulas of L1,2, then we write F |= Γ when for
all ϕ ∈ Γ and all valuation V , (F , V ) |= ϕ, and we say that Γ is valid in F .
2.2 Interaction Axioms
In the sequel, L1 and L2 are two normal modal logics for L1 and L2 respectively,
and L1,2 is a normal modal logic for L1,2 (we abusively write L1,2 for L{1,2} and
Li for L{i}, where i ∈ {1, 2}). Intuitively, an interaction axiom is a formula
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which cannot be equivalent to any formula of the modal language with a single
modality.
Definition 1. A set of interaction axioms w.r.t. a pair of logics (L1, L2) is a
finite set of formulas Γ ⊆ L1,2 for which there is no χ ∈ L1 ∪ L2 such that
χ↔
∧
Γ ∈ L1 + L2. (1)
In the sequel, x is a formula of L1 and Γ is a set of interaction axioms w.r.t.
(L1, L2).
Definition 2. We say that x is characterized by the set of interaction axioms
Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2) when
L1 + x = (L1 + L2 + Γ) ∩ L1. (2)
Moreover, x is conservatively characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2) when the set of
interaction axioms Γ satisfies the following condition as well:
L2 = (L1 + L2 + Γ) ∩ L2. (3)
Intuitively, Definition 2 tells us that an axiom x is characterized by a set of
interaction axioms Γ if, when we add the interaction axioms to the base logics,
we derive exactly the theorems for the language L1 obtained by only adding
axiom x to L1, and nothing else. For the case of conservative characterization,
by adding these interaction axioms Γ, we do not even obtain new theorems for
the language L2 as ‘side effects’, the theorems for this language just remain the
same as before.
Finally, we define a notion of minimality among the sets of interaction axioms
characterizing an axiom x.
Definition 3. The axiom x is minimally characterized by the set of interaction
axioms Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2) when x is characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2) and there is
no set of interaction axioms Γ′ such that Γ >L1+L2 Γ
′ and x is still characterized
by Γ′ w.r.t. (L1, L2).
2.3 Definability of Modalities and Characterization of Ax-
ioms
The definability of modalities in terms of other modalities is studied from a theo-
retical point of view by Halpern et al. [17]. This study is subsequently applied to
epistemic logic by the same authors in [16]. Three notions of definability emerge
from this work: explicit definability, implicit definability and reducibility. It has
been proven that, for modal logic, explicit definability coincides with the con-
junction of implicit definability and reducibility (unlike first-order logic, where
the notion of explicit definability coincides with implicit definability only). In
this article, we are interested only in the notion of explicit definability, which is
also used in [25].
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Definition 4. Let {i, j} = {1, 2}. The modality 〈i〉 is explicitly defined in the
logic Li,j in terms of the modality 〈j〉 by a formula defi(p) ∈ Lj if, and only if,
〈i〉p↔ defi(p) ∈ Li,j . (Def 〈i〉)
The following key theorem will play an important role in the last section. It
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for an axiom to be (conservatively)
characterized by a set of interaction axioms. It also states that in case one of
the modalities is definable in terms of the other, then this characterization is
actually minimal (in the sense of Definition 3).
Theorem 1. Assume that 〈2〉 is explicitly defined in L1 + L2 + Γ in terms of
〈1〉 by a formula def2(p) ∈ L1 positive in p. Then, the following are equivalent:
• x is characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2);
• L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x + {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}.
Moreover, assume that 〈1〉 is also explicitly defined in L1+L2+Γ in terms of
〈2〉 by a formula def1(p) ∈ L2 positive in p. Then, the following are equivalent:
• x is conservatively characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2);
• L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x + {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)} and
L1 + L2 + Γ = L2 + {〈1〉p↔ def1(p)}.
Finally, in both cases, the axiom x is (conservatively) characterized by Γ
w.r.t. (L1, L2) if, and only if, it is minimally (conservatively) characterized by
Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2).
3 Epistemic and Doxastic Logics
In this section, we will see the standard formal semantics of knowledge, belief
and conditional belief. For examples and applications of these semantics in
computer science, the interested reader can consult [10] or [27]. We will also
introduce the convoluted axioms .2, .3 and .4 together with the classes of frames
they define.
3.1 Logics of Knowledge and Belief
3.1.1 Epistemic and doxastic languages
We define the epistemic-doxastic language LKB by the following BNF grammar:
LKB : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Bϕ | Kϕ
where p ranges over P. The propositional language L0 is the language LKB
without the knowledge and belief operators K and B. The language LK is
the language LKB without the belief operator B, and the language LB is the
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language LKB without the knowledge operator K. The formula Bϕ reads as
‘the agent believes ϕ’ and Kϕ reads as ‘the agent knows ϕ’. Their dual operators
〈B〉ϕ and 〈K〉ϕ are abbreviations of ¬B¬ϕ and ¬K¬ϕ respectively.
Remark 1. We have to be careful with the notion of belief, since the term ‘be-
lief’ has different meanings: my belief that it will rain tomorrow is intuitively
different from my belief that the Fermat-Wilson theorem is correct. This intu-
itive semantic difference that anyone can perceive stems from the fact that the
doxastic strength of these two beliefs are not on the same ‘scale’. Lenzen ar-
gues that there are two different kinds of belief, which he calls weak and strong
belief (or conviction) [24]. A relatively detailed analysis distinguishing weak
from strong belief is presented by Shoham and Leyton-Brown [29, p. 414-415].
Also see [24, 3]. In this paper, we only deal with the notion of strong belief (or
conviction) and Bϕ stands for this notion. We will sometimes denote Bw for
the notion of weak belief.
3.1.2 Semantics
In epistemic logic, a semantics of the modal operators of belief (B) and knowl-
edge (K) is often provided by means of a Kripke semantics. The first logical
framework combining these two operators with a Kripke semantics was proposed
by Kraus and Lehmann [19].
An epistemic-doxastic model M is a (bi-modal) Kripke model as defined in
Section 2.1 where R1 is interpreted as the accessibility relation for knowledge
and R2 is interpreted as the accessibility relation for belief. The truth conditions
forM, w |= ϕ are then defined as in Section 2.1. An epistemic-doxastic frame F
is an epistemic-doxastic model without a valuation. We often denote RK(w) =
{v ∈W | wRKv} and RB(w) = {v ∈W | wRBv}.
3.1.3 Logics
Below, we give a list of properties of the accessibility relations RB and RK
that will be used in the rest of the article. We also give, below each property,
the axiom which defines the class of epistemic-doxastic frames that fulfill this
property (see [7, Def. 3.2] for a definition of the notion of definability). We
choose, without any particular reason, to use the knowledge modality to write
these conditions.
• serial : RK(w) 6= ∅
Axiom D: Kϕ→ 〈K〉ϕ;
• transitive: If w′ ∈ RK(w) and w′′ ∈ RK(w′), then w′′ ∈ RK(w)
Axiom 4: Kϕ→ KKϕ;
• Euclidean: If w′ ∈ RK(w) and w′′ ∈ RK(w), then w′ ∈ RK(w′′)
Axiom 5: ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ;
• reflexive: w ∈ RK(w)
Axiom T: Kϕ→ ϕ;
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• symetric: If w′ ∈ RK(w), then w ∈ RK(w′)
Axiom B: ϕ→ K¬K¬ϕ;
• confluent : If w′ ∈ RK(w) and w′′ ∈ RK(w), then there is v such that
v ∈ RK(w′) and v ∈ RK(w′′)
Axiom .2: 〈K〉Kϕ→ K〈K〉ϕ;
• weakly connected : If w′ ∈ RK(w) and w′′ ∈ RK(w), then w′ = w′′ or
w′ ∈ RK(w′′) or w′′ ∈ RK(w′)
Axiom .3: 〈K〉ϕ∧ 〈K〉ψ → 〈K〉(ϕ∧ψ)∨ 〈K〉(ψ∧ 〈K〉ϕ)∨ 〈K〉(ϕ∧〈K〉ψ);
• R1 : If w′ ∈ RK(w) and w 6= w′ and w′′ ∈ RK(w), then w′ ∈ RK(w′′)
Axiom .4: (ϕ ∧ 〈K〉Kϕ)→ Kϕ.
The logic KD45B is the smallest normal modal logic for LB generated by the
set of axioms {D, 4, 5}. For any x ∈ {.2, .3, .4}, the logic S4.xK is the smallest
normal modal logic for LK generated by the set of axioms {T, 4, x}. We have
the following relationship between these logics:
S4K ⊂ S4.2K ⊂ S4.3K ⊂ S4.4K ⊂ S5K .
3.2 Logics of Knowledge and Conditional Belief
3.2.1 A language for knowledge and conditional belief
Taking up the work of Friedman and Halpern [13], we define the syntax of the
language LKBq inductively by the following BNF grammar:
LKBq : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Bϕϕ | Kϕ
where p ranges over P. The symbol > is an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p, and Bϕ is
an abbreviation for B>ϕ. The language LK is LKBq without the belief operator
Bψ, and the language LBψ is LKBq without the knowledge operator K.
3.2.2 Semantics
Numerous semantics have been proposed for conditional beliefs, such as prefer-
ential structures [20], -semantics [1], possibilistic structures [9], and κ-ranking
[31, 30]. They all have in common that they validate the axiomatic system P
originally introduced in [20]. This remarkable fact is explained by Friedman
and Halpern [13], where a general framework based on plausibility measures is
proposed. As proved in that article, plausibility measures generalize all these
semantics. So, we adopt the general framework of plausibility measures to pro-
vide a semantics for LKBq . Plausibility spaces and epistemic-plausibility spaces
were introduced by Friedman and Halpern respectively in [12] and [13]. We can
nevertheless mention that other logical formalisms dealing with conditional be-
liefs are proposed in the economics literature [8]. These other formalisms have
been taken up in the field of dynamic epistemic logic [4, 5, 6].
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If W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, then an algebra over W is a set
of subsets of W closed under union and complementation. In the rest of the
article, D is a non-empty set partially ordered by a relation ≤ (so that ≤ is
reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric). We further assume that D contains
two special elements > and ⊥ such that for all d ∈ D, ⊥ ≤ d ≤ >. As usual,
we define the ordering < by taking d1 < d2 if and only if d1 ≤ d2 and d1 6= d2.
Definition 5. A (qualitative) plausibility space is a tuple S = (W,A, P l) where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• A is an algebra over W ;
• Pl : A → D is a function mapping sets of A into D and satisfying the
following conditions:
A0 Pl(W ) = > and Pl(∅) = ⊥;
A1 If A ⊆ B, then Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B);
A2 If A,B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl(A ∪ B) > Pl(C), and
Pl(A ∪ C) > Pl(B), then Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C);
A3 If Pl(A) = Pl(B) = ⊥, then Pl(A ∪B) = ⊥.
We denote by S the class of all (qualitative) plausibility spaces.
We can naturally introduce an accessibility relation RK to (qualitative) plau-
sibility space in order to give a semantics to the knowledge modality of the
language LKBq . This yields the notion of epistemic plausibility space:
Definition 6. An epistemic-plausibility space is a tuple M = (W,RK , V,P)
where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• RK ∈ 2W×W is a binary relation over W called an accessibility relation;
• V : P → 2W is a function called a valuation mapping propositional vari-
ables to subsets of W ;
• P : W → S is a function called a plausibility assignment mapping each
world w ∈W to a (qualitative) plausibility space (Ww,Aw, P lw) such that
Ww ⊆W .
We denote by SK the class of all (qualitative) epistemic-plausibility spaces.
Definition 7. Let ϕ ∈ LKBq , let M be an epistemic-plausibility space and let
w ∈M. The satisfaction relation M, w |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ϕ′
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= Bψϕ iff either Plw(JψKw) = ⊥ or
Plw(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) > Plw(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw)
M, w |= Kϕ iff for all v ∈ RK(w),M, v |= ϕ
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where JϕKw = {v ∈Ww | M, v |= ϕ}. We abusively write w ∈ M for w ∈ W ,
and we also write M |= ϕ when for all w ∈ M, M, w |= ϕ. If Γ is a set of
formulae (possibly infinite), we write M |= Γ when M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ.
3.2.3 Logics
The following theorem presents a slightly different version of the axiomatic
system P originally introduced by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [20] for non-
monotonic logics.
Theorem 2. [13] The following logic KBq is a sound and complete axiomati-
zation of LBq with respect to all (qualitative) plausibility spaces.
Prop : All inferences rules of propositional logic and
substitution instances of propositional tautologies
C1 : Bψψ
C2 : (Bψϕ1 ∧Bψϕ2)→ Bψ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
C3 : (Bψ1ϕ ∧Bψ2ϕ)→ Bψ1∨ψ2ϕ
C4 : (Bψϕ ∧Bψχ)→ Bψ∧ϕχ
RC1 : If ψ ↔ ψ′ then Bψϕ↔ Bψ′ϕ
RC2 : If ϕ→ ϕ′ then Bψϕ→ Bψϕ′
Moreover, KKBq := KK+KBq is a sound and strongly complete axiomatiza-
tion for LKBq with respect to all (qualitative) epistemic-plausibility spaces.
Note that the proof of Theorem 2 in [13] only considers accessibility relations
which are equivalence relations (it corresponds to Theorem 11 of [13]). The proof
can easily be adapted to our more general setting and the proof shows in fact
that the logics are strongly complete. Compactness of KKBq follows from this
strong completeness result.
Corollary 1. KKBq is compact, i.e., for all Γ ⊆ LKBq and all ϕ ∈ LKBq , if
Γ |= ϕ, then for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ, we have that Γ0 |= ϕ.
The axiom (Bq(ϕ → ϕ′) ∧ Bqϕ) → Bqϕ′ and the inference rule from ϕ
infer Bqϕ are both derivable in KBq . Therefore, KBq is also a normal modal
logic. Hence, the language LKBq can also be given a Kripke semantics: the
models would be of the form M = (W,RK , {Rψ | ψ ∈ LKBq}, V ), where Rψ is
an accessibility relation for each ψ ∈ LKBq . This entails that the first part of
Theorem 1 (and its proof) can easily be adapted to the setting of conditional
beliefs, where the second modality [2] is replaced by a family of modalities
{Bq | ψ ∈ LKBq}. We obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let Γ ⊆ LKBq and x ∈ LKBq . Assume that for all ψ ∈ LKBq the
modality Bψp is explicitly defined in S4K +KBq + Γ in terms of K by a formula
defBψp ∈ LK positive in p. Then, the following are equivalent:
• x is characterized by Γ w.r.t. (S4K ,KBq );
• S4K + KBq + Γ = S4K + x + {Bqp↔ defBqp}.
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4 Interaction Axioms
In this section, we will set out the interaction axioms which have been proposed
and discussed in the epistemic logic literature and which connect the notions
of belief or conditional belief with the notion of knowledge. We will start by
reviewing interaction axioms that deal with belief, and then we will consider
interaction axioms that deal with conditional belief. Note that a classification
of certain interaction principles has been proposed by van der Hoek [33].2
4.1 Interaction Axioms between Knowledge and Belief
The following interaction axioms were suggested by Hintikka [18]:
Kp→ Bp (I1)
Bp→ KBp (I2)
Axiom I1 is a cornerstone of epistemic logic. Just as axiom T, it follows from
the classical analysis of knowledge of Plato presented in the Theaetetus. Axiom
I2 highlights the fact that the agent has “privileged access” to his doxastic state.
Bp→ BKp (I3)
Axiom I3 above was suggested by Lenzen [24]. It characterizes a notion of
belief corresponding to some sort of conviction or certainty. This kind of belief
is therefore different from the notion of weak belief which can be represented by
a probability superior to 0.5, like my belief that “it will rain tomorrow”.
Another interaction axiom also introduced by [24] defines belief in terms of
knowledge:
Bp↔ 〈K〉Kp (I4)
Although this definition might seem a bit mysterious at first sight, it actually
makes perfect sense, as explained in [24]. Indeed, the left to right direction
Bp → 〈K〉Kp can be rewritten K¬Kp → ¬Bp, that is, ¬(K¬Kp ∧ Bp). This
first implication states that the agent cannot, at the same time, know that she
does not know a proposition and be certain of this very proposition. The right
to left direction 〈K〉Kp → Bp can be rewritten 〈B〉¬p → K¬Kp. This second
implication states that, if the agent considers it possible that p might be false,
then she knows that she does not know p.
The last interaction axiom we will consider is in fact a definition of knowledge
in terms of belief:
Kp↔ (p ∧Bp) (I5)
This list of interaction axioms is incomplete. See [3] for more information about
interaction axioms and axioms of epistemic logic.
2The classification is as follows. If X,Y, Z are epistemic operators, Xϕ→ Y Zϕ are called
positive introspection formulas, ¬Xϕ → Y ¬Zϕ are called negative introspection formulas,
XY ϕ → Zϕ are called positive extraspection formulas, X¬Y → ¬Zϕ are called negative
extraspection formulas, and X(Y ϕ→ ϕ) are called trust formulas.
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Proposition 4. The sets {I1}, {I2}, {I3}, {I4}, {I5} and {I1, I2, I3} are sets
of interaction axioms with respect to (S4K ,KD45B).
3
The collapse of knowledge and belief. In any logic of knowledge and be-
lief, if we adopt axiom 5 for the notion of knowledge, axiom D for the notion of
belief and I1 as the only interaction axiom, then we end up with counterintu-
itive properties. First, as noted by Voorbraak [34], we can derive the theorem
BKp → Kp.4 This theorem entails that everything one believes to know is in
fact true. As it turns out, these axioms are adopted in the first logical frame-
work combining modalities of knowledge and belief [19]. Moreover, if we add
the axiom I3, we can also prove that Bp → Kp. This theorem collapses the
distinction between the notions of knowledge and belief.
A systematic approach has been proposed by van der Hoek to avoid this
collapse [33]. He showed, thanks to correspondence theory, that any multi-
modal logic with both knowledge and belief modalities that includes the set of
axioms {D, 5, I1, I3} entails the theorem Bp → Kp. He also showed, however,
that for each proper subset of {D, 5, I1, I3}, counter-models can be built which
show that none of those sets of axioms entail the collapse of the distinction
between knowledge and belief. So we have to drop one principle in {D, 5, I1, I3}.
Axioms D and I3 are hardly controversial given our understanding of the notion
of strong belief. In this case we have to drop either I1 or 5. Voorbraak proposes
to drop axiom I1. His notion of knowledge, which he calls objective knowledge,
is therefore unusual in so far as it implies that you can know something even
if you don’t believe it. But, as we have said, he clearly warns that this notion
applies to any information-processing device, and not necessarily just to humans.
Note that Floridi has similar reservations against axiom I1 [11], since his notion
of being informed shares similar features with Voorbraak’s notion of objective
knowledge. Halpern also proposes in [15] to drop I1 as a general schema, keeping
only those instances of I1 where p is propositional. This restriction looks a bit
ad hoc at first sight. Dropping axiom 5 seems to be the most reasonable choice
in light of the discussion about this axiom in Footnote 1.
By dropping 5, we then only have to investigate the logics between S4 and
S5 as possible candidates for a logic of knowledge (S5 excluded), as Lenzen did
3In the set {I1, I2, I3}, we implicitly assume that the sets of propositional letters appearing
in I1, I2 and I3 respectively are disjoint so that we can uniformly and independently replace
each of them by arbitrary formulas to check whether Expression (1) of Definition 1 holds.
4Here is the proof:
1 Kp→ Bp Axiom I1
2 K¬Kp→ B¬Kp I1 : ¬Kp/p
3 Bp→ ¬B¬p Axiom D
4 B¬p→ ¬Bp 3, contraposition
5 B¬Kp→ ¬BKp 4 : Kp/p
6 ¬Kp→ K¬Kp Axiom 5
7 ¬Kp→ B¬Kp 6,2, Modus Ponens
8 ¬Kp→ ¬BKp 7,5, Modus Ponens
9 BKp→ Kp 8, contraposition.
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in [25].
4.2 Interaction Axioms between Knowledge and Condi-
tional Belief
The following axioms Iq1, I
q
2 and I
q
3 are natural conditional versions of the axioms
I1, I2, I3: if q is replaced by >, then these three axioms correspond to the
axioms I1, I2, I3. Axioms I
q
1 and I
q
2 are first introduced by Moses and Shoham
[28] and are also adopted by Friedman and Halpern [12]. Axiom Iq3 is actually
introduced by Lamarre and Shoham [22] in the form Bqp→ BqwK(q → p).
Kp→ Bqp (Iq1)
Bqp→ KBqp (Iq2)
Bqp→ BqK(q → p) (Iq3)
Axiom Iq1 states that, if the agent knows that p, then she also believes that
p, and so on under any assumption q. Note that Iq1 entails the weaker principle
Kp → (q → Bqp), which is connected to the Lehrer and Paxton’s definition of
knowledge as undefeated true belief [23]. Indeed, this derived principle states
that if the agent knows that p (formally Kp), then her belief in p cannot be
defeated by any true information q (formally q → Bqp). Note that this very
principle entails an even weaker variant of Iq1 introduced by Moses and Shoham
[28], namely Kp → (Bqp ∨K¬q), i.e. Kp → (〈K〉q → Bqp). Axiom Iq2 is a
straightforward generalization of I2. As for I
q
3, it states that, if the agent
believes p under the assumption that q, then, given this very assumption q, she
also believes that she knows p conditional on q.
The axioms Iq4 and I
q
5 below are also introduced by Lamarre and Shoham
[22]:
¬Bqp→ K(〈K〉q → ¬Bqp) (Iq4)
〈K〉q → ¬Bq⊥ (Iq5)
Axiom Iq4 is a conditional version of axiom ¬Bp→ K¬Bp. It is introduced
by Lamarre and Shoham [22] in the form ¬Bqp → K(K¬q ∨ ¬Bqp). Another
possible conditional version of axiom ¬Bp → K¬Bp could have been ¬Bqp →
K¬Bqp, and this axiom is indeed adopted in [28]. However, this simpler axiom
ignores the possibility of assumptions q which are known to be false (K¬q): in
that case, these assumptions q should not be taken into account in the reasoning.
Axiom Iq5 states that, if q is compatible with everything the agents knows,
then her beliefs given this assumption cannot be inconsistent. In particular,
if q holds then the agent’s doxastic state given this assumption cannot be in-
consistent: q → ¬Bq⊥ (because q → 〈K〉q is valid according to axiom T).
Axiom Iq5 is introduced by Lamarre and Shoham [22] in the equivalent form
〈K〉q → (Bqp→ ¬Bq¬p). Together with Iq1 and system P, it entails that knowl-
edge is definable in terms of conditional belief. This definition of knowledge
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actually coincides with the notion of “safe belief” introduced by Baltag and
Smets [6]:
Kp := B¬p⊥ (Def K’)
Proposition 5. The sets {Iq1}, {Iq2}, {Iq3}, {Iq4}, {Iq5} and {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} are
sets of interaction axioms with respect to (S4K ,KBq ).
5
5 Definability of Knowledge, Belief and Condi-
tional Belief
Obviously, putting together an epistemic logic and a doxastic logic, for example
S4K + KD45B , does not yield a genuine epistemic-doxastic logic since the two
concepts will not interact. We need to add interaction axioms. Halpern et al.
[16] only consider the interaction axioms I1 and I2 suggested by Hintikka [18].
We will also add the interaction axiom I3, suggested by Lenzen [24].
5.1 Defining Belief in Terms of Knowledge
Lenzen is the first to note that the belief modality can be defined in terms of
knowledge if we adopt {I1, I2, I3} as interaction axioms:
Theorem 6. [25] The belief modality B is explicitly defined in the logic L :=
S4K + KD45B + {I1, I2, I3} by the formula defBp := 〈K〉Kp ∈ LK :
Bp↔ 〈K〉Kp ∈ L (Def B)
Consequently, the belief modality B is also defined by (Def B) in any logic
containing L.
As a consequence of this theorem, the belief modality is also explicitly defined
by Bp := 〈K〉Kp in the logics S4.xK+KD45B+{I1, I2, I3}, where x ranges over
{.2, .3, .4}. This result is in contrast with Theorem 4.8 of [16], from which it
follows that the belief modality cannot be explicitly defined in the logic S4.xK +
KD45B + {I1, I2}, and for any x ∈ {.2, .3, .4}. We see here that the increase in
expressivity due to the addition of the interaction axiom I3 plays an important
role in bridging the gap between belief and knowledge. Note that the definition
(Def B) of belief in terms of knowledge corresponds to the interaction axiom I4
of Section 4.1.
5In the set {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}, we implicitly assume that the sets of propositional letters
appearing in Iq1, I
q
2, I
q
3, I
q
4 and I
q
5 respectively are disjoint so that we can uniformly and inde-
pendently substitute each of them by arbitrary formulas to check whether Expression (1) of
Definition 1 holds.
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5.2 Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief
Defining knowledge in terms of belief depends on the logic of knowledge that
we deal with. As the following proposition shows, knowledge can be defined in
terms of belief if the logic of knowledge is S4.4, but not if the logic of knowledge
is S4 and S4.x, where x ranges over {.2, .3}.
Theorem 7. [3]
1. The knowledge modality K is explicitly defined in the logic L.4 := S4.4K +
KD45B + {I1, I2, I3} by the formula defKp := p ∧Bp ∈ LB:
Kp↔ p ∧Bp ∈ L.4 (Def K)
2. The knowledge modality K cannot be explicitly defined in the logics S4.xK+
KD45B + {I1, I2, I3} for any x ∈ {.2, .3}.
This result can be contrasted with Theorem 4.1 of [16], from which it follows
that the knowledge modality cannot be explicitly defined in the logic S4.4K +
KD45B + {KB1,KB2}. Again, the increase in expressivity due to the addition of
the interaction axiom I3 plays an important role in bridging the gap between
belief and knowledge.
5.3 Defining Conditional Belief in Terms of Knowledge
The conditions under which conditional belief can be defined in terms of knowl-
edge (and reciprocally) have been less explored in the epistemic logic literature.
Theorem 8. The conditional belief modality Bqp is explicitly defined in the
logic Lq := S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} by the formula defBqp := 〈K〉q →
〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p)) ∈ LK :
Bqp↔ (〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p))) ∈ Lq (Def Bqp)
Moreover, the following also holds:
S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} = S4.3K + {Bqp↔ defBqp} (4)
The definition (Def Bqp) of conditional belief in terms of knowledge can be
viewed as a generalization of the definition of belief in terms of knowledge of Sec-
tion 4.1: Bp↔ 〈K〉Kp, that is I4. The intuitive interpretations that we gave for
I4 can also be generalized to the conditional case. The left to right direction of
(Def Bqp) can be rewritten as follows: ¬ (Bqp ∧ 〈K〉q ∧K (q → 〈K〉 (q ∧ ¬p))).
It states that it is impossible that the agent believes p given q while at the same
time knowing that if q holds then he may consider possible that p does not hold
(assuming that he already considers q possible). This seems a reasonable claim.
Reciprocally, the right to left direction of (Def Bqp) can be rewritten as follows:
¬Bq¬p→ 〈K〉q∧K (q → 〈K〉 (q ∧ p)). It states that if the agent considers that
p might be true given q, then the agent considers q (epistemically) possible and
knows that if q holds then it is possible that p might also hold. This seems also
reasonable.
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5.4 Defining Knowledge in Terms of Conditional Belief
From Equation (Def Bqp), we easily obtain that:
Proposition 9. The knowledge modality Kp is explicitly defined in the logic Lq
by the formula defKp := B
¬p⊥ ∈ LBq :
Kp↔ B¬p⊥ ∈ Lq (Def K’)
Proof. To prove that Kp → B¬p⊥ ∈ Lq, it suffices to observe that Kp →
B¬pp ∈ Lq by the axiom Iq1 and that B¬p¬p is also an axiom of Lq. Therefore,
Kp → B¬p(p ∧ ¬p) ∈ Lq by distributivity of Bq. So, Kp → B¬p⊥ ∈ Lq. The
proof that B¬p⊥ → Kp ∈ Lq follows from the contraposition of axiom Iq5.
The definition (Def K’) can be rewritten equivalently as follows: 〈K〉p ↔
¬Bp¬>. So, in a sense, the intuition underlying this definition is that the epis-
temic possibility that p holds can be identified with the fact that p is compatible
with the beliefs of the agent.
6 Axioms .2, .3 and .4 as Interaction Axioms
The results of this final section are obtained by applying Theorem 1 either to
the results of Lenzen [25] or to the results obtained in the previous section. The
first item of Theorem 10 below somehow makes more explicit the fact that .2 is
really characterized by the interaction axioms {I1, I2, I3}. Lenzen [25] showed
that S4K + KD45B + {I1, I2, I3} = S4.2K + {Bp ↔ 〈K〉Kp}. However, this
expression alone cannot account for the fact that .2 is really characterized by
the interaction axioms {I1, I2, I3}. As for the second item of Theorem 10, it
shows that assuming that knowledge obeys .4 has the same consequences for
the logic of knowledge as assuming that knowledge is S4, belief is KD45, and
knowledge is true belief.
Theorem 10. 1. The axiom .2 is characterized w.r.t. the pair (S4K ,KD45B)
by the set of interaction axioms {I1, I2, I3}.
2. The axiom .4 is conservatively characterized w.r.t. the pair (S4K ,KD45B)
by the interaction axiom I5.
Proof. It follows from a direct application of Theorem 1 to the results of [25],
namely the fact that S4K+KD45B+{I1, I2, I3} = S4.2K+{Bp↔ 〈K〉Kp} (for
the first result) and S4K + KD45B + {I5} = KD45B + {I5} = S4.4K + {Bp ↔
〈K〉Kp} (for the second result). To apply Theorem 1, we remind that p is
positive in 〈K〉Kp.
Stalnaker [32] argued that the intuition underlying the logic S4.3 consists in
defining knowledge as true belief which cannot be defeated by any true fact. In
other words, a fact is known if and only if it is true and it will still be believed
after learning any true fact. Our interaction axiom Iq1 formalizes this intuition.
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Theorem 11. The axiom .3 is characterized w.r.t. the pair (S4K ,KBq ) by the
set of interaction axioms {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}.
Proof. Theorem 1 can easily be adapted to a setting where the second modality
[2] is replaced by a family of modalities of the form Bq. In that case, the proof of
the (adapted) Theorem 1 follows the same reasoning (because of the comments
that follow Theorem 2). Then, the proof of our theorem follows from a direct
application of (an adaptation to the case of conditional belief of) Theorem 1 to
the results of Theorems 8, namely the fact that S4K+KBq+{Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} =
KBq + {Kp↔ defKp} = S4.3K + {Bqp↔ defBqp}.
7 Conclusion
The second item of Theorem 10 tells us that in the epistemic-doxastic context
(S4K , KD45B), the axiom .4 characterizes the fact that knowledge is actually
defined as true belief (a rather strong assumption for knowledge). Although it
was acknowledged by all epistemic logicians that axiom .4 characterized knowl-
edge as true belief, this could never be justified and explained rigorously. We
claim that our meta-theory of modal logic fills this conceptual gap. Likewise,
still in the context of (S4K , KD45B), the first item of Theorem 10 tells us that
axiom .2 characterizes the fact that the agent knows his beliefs and disbeliefs
and that his beliefs are in fact certainties, convictions, and not simply ‘weak’
beliefs. Theorem 11 provides similar results with conditional beliefs. Stalnaker
[32] claimed that S4.3 is a logic where knowledge is defined as true belief which
cannot be defeated by any true fact. A similar definition of knowledge is pro-
pounded in epistemology by Lehrer and Paxson [23]. The claim of Stalnaker
was based on informal semantic arguments. This claim is supported rigorously
in our approach by the fact that the axiom .3 is characterized by the set of inter-
action axioms {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} in the epistemic-doxastic context (S4K ,KBq ),
where we recall that Iq1 entails Kp → (q → Bqp): if the agent knows p (for-
mally Kp) then this belief in p cannot be defeated by any true fact q (formally
q → Bqp). Hence, our theory of interaction axioms provides a precise and
rigorous justification of Stalnaker’s ‘informal’ claim.
Overall, our theory of characterizing axioms via interaction axioms enables
us to carry out a rigorous and fine-grained analysis of the intuitive assumptions
underlying the logics of knowledge between S4 and S5. It can give precise
reasons for choosing a specific epistemic logic for representing and reasoning
about a given situation. In a sense, our theory provides meaningful logical
foundations for pursuing rigorous epistemological investigations.
Acknowledgements. I thank a reviewer for her/his detailed comments.
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A Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
Proposition 4. The sets {I1}, {I2}, {I3}, {I4}, {I5} and {I1, I2, I3} are sets
of interaction axioms with respect to (S4K ,KD45B).
6
Proof. First, we prove that {I1}, {I2}, {I3}, {I4}, {I5} are sets of interaction
axioms. It suffices to prove two things, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} (because of
the soundness and completeness of S4K + KD45B for the language LKB with
respect to the class of epistemic-doxastic models whose accessibility relation RK
is transitive and reflexive and whose accessibility relation RB is serial, transitive
and Euclidean):
1. there are two pointed epistemic-doxastic models (M1, w1) and (M2, w2)
such that they are bisimilar for RK but M1, w1 |= Ii and M2, w2 2 Ii,
2. there are two other pointed epistemic-doxastic models (M1, w1) and (M2, w2)
such that they are bisimilar for RB but M1, w1 |= Ii and M2, w2 2 Ii.
We do so for each axiom I1, I2, I3, I4 and I5. For each of them and for
each of the two subcases, we consider two pointed epistemic-doxastic models
(M1, w1) = ({w1, v1}, R1K , R1B , V 1, w1) and (M2, w2) = ({w2, v2}, R2K , R2B , V 2, w2)
such that V 1(p) = {w1} and V 2(p) = {w2} for all p ∈ P. For each case, only
the definitions of the accessibility relations R1K , R
2
K , R
1
B and R
2
B change. For
better readability, we omit the superscripts 1 and 2 for the worlds w and v, as
they should be clear from context.
6In the set {I1, I2, I3}, we implicitly assume that the sets of propositional letters appearing
in I1, I2 and I3 respectively are disjoint so that we can uniformly and independently replace
each of them by arbitrary formulas to check whether Expression (1) of Definition 1 holds.
20
• I1 : Kp→ Bp.
1. R1K = R
2
K = R
1
B = {(w,w), (v, v)} andR2B = {(w,w), (w, v), (v, w), (v, v)};
2. R1K = R
1
B = R
2
B = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v), (v, w)} andR2K = {(w,w), (v, v)}.
• I2 : Bp→ BKp.
1. R1K = {(w,w), (v, v)}, R1B = R2B = {(w, v), (v, v)} andR2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (v, w)};
2. R1K = R
2
K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)}, R1B = {(w, v), (v, v)} and R2B =
{(w,w), (v, v)}.
• I3 : Bp→ KBp.
1. R1K = R
1
B = R
2
B = {(w,w), (v, v)} and R2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)};
2. R1K = R
2
K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)}, R1B = {(w, v), (v, v)} and R2B =
{(w,w), (v, v)}.
• I4 : Bp→ 〈K〉Kp.
1. R1K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)}, R1B = R2B = {(w, v), (v, v)} and R2K =
{(w,w), (v, v)};
2. R1K = R
2
K = {(w,w), (v, v)}, R1B = {(w, v), (v, v)} andR2B = {(w,w), (w, v), (v, w), (v, v)}.
• I5 : Kp↔ (p ∧Bp).
1. R1K = R
1
B = R
2
B{(w,w), (v, v)} andR2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v), (v, w)};
2. R1K = R
1
B = R
2
K = {(w,w), (v, v)} andR2B = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v), (v, w)}.
The proof for the set of interaction axioms {I1, I2, I3} follows the same
method as above. For that case, we consider the same epistemic-doxastic models
as in the case I3:
1. R1K = R
1
B = R
2
B = {(w,w), (v, v)} and R2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)};
2. R1K = R
2
K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v)}, R1B = {(w, v), (v, v)} and R2B =
{(w,w), (v, v)}.
Proposition 5. The sets {Iq1}, {Iq2}, {Iq3}, {Iq4}, {Iq5} and {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} are
sets of interaction axioms with respect to (S4K ,KBq ).
7
Proof. The sets of interaction axioms {Iq1}, {Iq2}, {Iq3} and {Iq5} are dealt with
similarly to the way in which we dealt with the set of interaction axioms
{I1}, {I2}, {I3} and {I5}. We only need to replace the accessibility relations RB
by plausibility spaces (Ww,Aw, P lw) for each w ∈W . We do so as follows. For
any two worlds w, v ∈Wi, if there is an edge from w to v but not from v to w,
7In the set {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}, we implicitly assume that the sets of propositional letters
appearing in Iq1, I
q
2, I
q
3, I
q
4 and I
q
5 respectively are disjoint so that we can uniformly and inde-
pendently substitute each of them by arbitrary formulas to check whether Expression (1) of
Definition 1 holds.
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then we set Ww = {w, v}, P lw(w) = ⊥ and Plw(v) = >. If there is an edge from
w to v and an edge from v to w as well, then we set Ww = {w, v}, P lw(w) = >
and Plw(v) = >. In the first three cases, the counter-example formula is given
by considering q = > and it corresponds to the same formula as for the set of
interaction axioms {I1}, {I2} and {I3}. For the fourth case corresponding to
axiom Iq5, the counter-example is obtained by considering q = ¬p.
The set {Iq4} is dealt with using the following epistemic-plausibility models:
1. W 1w = W
2
w = {w}, Pl1w(w) = Pl2w(w) = >; W 1v = W 2v = {v}, Pl1v(v) =
Pl2v(v) = >; andR1K = {(w,w), (v, v)} andR2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v), (v, w)};
2. W 1w = {w, v}, Plw(w) = ⊥, Plw(v) = > and W 1v = {v}, Pl1v(v) = >;
W 2w = {w}, W 2v = {v} and Pl2w(w) = {w} and Pl2v(v) = {v}; and R1K =
R2K = {(w,w), (v, v), (w, v), (v, w)}.
The proof for the set {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} is dealt with by considering the same
epistemic-plausibility models as for the set {Iq4}.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Note that the proof of this theorem appears in [2] without the following Lemma.
Lemma 12. Let L be a normal modal logic for LA and let Γ be a set of formulas
of LA. Then,
Γ ⊆ L iff {(M, w) ∈ K | M, w |= L} ⊆ {(M, w) ∈ K | M, w |= Γ} (5)
Proof. The left to right direction is straightforward, so we only prove the right
to left direction. By contraposition, assume that Γ * L. Then, there is ϕ ∈ Γ
such that ϕ /∈ L. We are going to show that there is (M, w) ∈ K such that
M, w 2 ϕ andM, w |= L, so that the right-hand side of Expression (5) does not
hold. Assume towards a contradiction that there is no (M, w) ∈ K such that
M, w |= L ∪ {¬ϕ}. Then, by the compactness of K, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ L
such that for all (M, w) ∈ K,M, w |= ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn → ϕ. Then, by completeness
of the smallest modal logic K, we have that ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕn → ϕ ∈ K. So, because
K ⊆ L and ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn ∈ L, we have by application of Modus Ponens that
ϕ ∈ L. This contradicts the fact that ϕ /∈ L. Therefore, there is (M, w) ∈ K
such that M, w |= L and M, w 2 ϕ. This proves our result.
Theorem 1. Assume that 〈2〉 is explicitly defined in L1 + L2 + Γ in terms of
〈1〉 by a formula def2(p) ∈ L1 positive in p. Then, the following are equivalent:
• x is characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2);
• L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x + {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}.
Moreover, assume that 〈1〉 is also explicitly defined in L1+L2+Γ in terms of
〈2〉 by a formula def1(p) ∈ L2 positive in p. Then, the following are equivalent:
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• x is conservatively characterized by Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2);
• L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x + {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)} and
L1 + L2 + Γ = L2 + {〈1〉p↔ def1(p)}.
Finally, in both cases, the axiom x is (conservatively) characterized by Γ
w.r.t. (L1, L2) if, and only if, it is minimally (conservatively) characterized by
Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2).
Proof. The proof of the second part of the theorem is similar to the proof of the
first part. So, we only prove the first part. Assume that x is characterized by Γ
w.r.t. (L1, L2). Then, L1+x = (L1+L2+Γ)∩L1, and therefore L1+x ⊆ L1+L2+Γ.
Moreover, 〈2〉p↔ def2(p) ∈ L1 + L2 + Γ by assumption. Thus, L1 + x+ {〈2〉p↔
def2(p)} ⊆ L1+L2+Γ. Now, we prove the converse inclusion. Assume towards a
contradiction that there is ϕ ∈ L1+L2+Γ such that ϕ /∈ L1+x+{〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}.
Then, there is ϕ′ ∈ L1 such that ϕ↔ ϕ′ ∈ L1 + L2 + Γ, because 〈2〉 is explicitly
definable in terms of 〈1〉 in L1 + L2 + Γ. Then, ϕ′ ∈ (L1 + L2 + Γ) ∩ L1, i.e.,
ϕ′ ∈ L1 + x. Then, by performing the inverse translation that we followed to
obtain ϕ′ from ϕ, we conclude that ϕ ∈ L1 + x + {〈2〉p ↔ def2(p)}. This is
impossible, and therefore L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x + {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}.
Now, assume that L1 + L2 + Γ = L1 + x+ {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}. We are going to
prove that L1 + x = (L1 + L2 + Γ)∩L1. The right to left inclusion is immediate,
because x ∈ L1 +L2 +Γ by assumption. Now, we prove that (L1 +L2 +Γ)∩L1 ⊆
L1 + x. Because of Lemma 12, this amounts to prove that for all Kripke models
M, for all w ∈M, ifM, w |= L1 + x, thenM, w |= (L1 + L2 + Γ)∩L1. In order
to do so, we are going to build a Kripke model (M′, w′) such that (M, w) and
(M′, w′) are bisimilar w.r.t. the modality 〈1〉 and such that M′, w′ |= L1 + x +
{〈2〉p ↔ def2(p)} (∗), that is, M′, w′ |= L1 + L2 + Γ (recall the assumption).
This will prove the second inclusion. If (M, w) = (W,R1, R2, V, w), then we
define the (pointed) Kripke model (M′, w′) := (W,R1, R′2, V, w), where R′2 is
defined as follows. First, we define the (pointed) Kripke model (M′′, w) :=
(W,R1, R2, V
′′, w) by setting V ′′ such that for all q 6= p, V ′′(q) = V (q) and such
that V ′′(p) = {v}. Then, for all u, v ∈ W , we set uR′2v in M′ if, and only if,
M′′, u |= def2(p). Then, using the fact that def2(p) is positive in p, one can
easily show that (∗) holds. This proves the second inclusion.
Finally, we prove the last part of the theorem. Assume towards a contradic-
tion that x is characterized by the set of interaction axioms Γ w.r.t. (L1, L2) and
that there is a set of interaction axioms Γ′ such that Γ >L1+L2 Γ
′ and such that
x is also characterized by Γ′ w.r.t. (L1, L2). Because Γ >L1+L2 Γ
′, we should have
that L1 + L2 + Γ ⊂ L1 + L2 + Γ′. However, since x is characterized by Γ and Γ′,
we should also have that L1 +L2 + Γ = L1 +L2 + Γ
′ = L1 + x+ {〈2〉p↔ def2(p)}
by the result of the first part of the theorem. This is impossible.
C Proof of Theorem 8
We first prove a series of lemmata. We also introduce a specific definition of
epistemic plausibility space.
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Lemma 13. Let L be a modal logic for LKBq such that KKBq ⊆ L and let
Γ ⊆ LKBq . Then,
Γ ⊆ L iff {(M, w) ∈ SK | M, w |= L} ⊆ {(M, w) ∈ SK | M, w |= Γ} (6)
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 12, except that we use the
completeness and the compactness of KKBq instead of K, which was proved in
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 respectively.
Definition 8. Let (M, w) = (W,RK , V,P) be a pointed epistemic-plausibility
space. The pointed epistemic-plausibility space denoted by (M∗, w∗) = (W ∗, R∗K , V ∗,P∗, w∗)
is defined as follows:
• W ∗ = W ; R∗K = RK ; V ∗ = V ;
• for all w ∈W ∗, P∗(w) = (W ∗w,A∗w, P l∗w) where:
– W ∗w = RK(w);
– A∗w = Aw ∩ {RK(w)};
– Pl∗w is such that
1. for all A,B ∈ A∗w, Pl∗w(A) ≥ Pl∗w(B) iff there is v ∈ A such that
for all u ∈ B, v ∈ RK(u);
2. Pl∗w(A) = ⊥ iff A ∩W ∗w = ∅.
Lemma 14. Let M be a pointed epistemic-plausibility space such that M |=
S4.3K . Then, for all w ∈ M, Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) ≥ Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw) iff M, w |=
〈K〉(ψ ∧K(ψ → ϕ)).
Proof. Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) ≥ Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw)
iff there is v ∈ RK(w) such that M, v |= ψ ∧ ϕ and for all u ∈ RK(w) such
that M, u |= ψ ∧ ¬ϕ, we have that v ∈ RK(u);
iff there is v ∈ RK(w) such that M, v |= ψ ∧ ϕ and for all u ∈ RK(w), if
v /∈ RK(u) then M, u 2 ψ ∧ ¬ϕ;
iff there is v ∈ RK(w) such that M, v |= ψ ∧ ϕ and for all u ∈ RK(w), if
u ∈ RK(v) then M, u |= ψ → ϕ by weak connectedness of RK ;
iff there is v ∈ RK(w) such that M, v |= ψ ∧ ϕ and for all u ∈ RK(v),
M, u |= ψ → ϕ by transitivity of RK ;
iff M, w |= 〈K〉((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∧K(ψ → ϕ));
iff M, w |= 〈K〉(ψ ∧K(ψ → ϕ)) by reflexivity of RK .
Lemma 15. Let M be an epistemic-plausibility space such that M∗ |= S4.3K .
Then, for all w ∈M∗ such thatM∗, w |= 〈K〉ψ, Pl∗w(Jψ∧ϕKw) ≥ Pl∗w(Jψ∧¬ϕK)
iff Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) > Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕK).
Proof. Assume that Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) ≥ Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw) and assume towards a
contradiction that Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) = Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw). Then, there are u, v ∈
R∗K(w) such that for all t ∈ R∗K(w), we have that v ∈ R∗K(t), u ∈ R∗K(t),
M∗, u |= ψ∧ϕ andM∗, v |= ψ∧¬ϕ (∗). However,M∗, w |= 〈K〉(ψ∧K(ψ → ϕ))
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because M∗ |= Bqp ↔ (〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p))) and M∗, w |= 〈K〉ψ by
assumption. So, there is t ∈ R∗K(w) such that M∗, t |= K(ψ → ϕ). This
contradicts (∗).
Lemma 16. Let (M, w) be a pointed epistemic-plausibility model such that
M, w |= S4.3K + {Bqp ↔ (〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p)))}. Then, for all ϕ ∈
LKBq , it holds that M, w |= ϕ iff M∗, w∗ |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ.
• ϕ = p, ϕ = ϕ∧ϕ′ and ϕ = ¬ψ work by definition of V ∗ and by Induction
Hypothesis;
• ϕ = Kψ works also by Induction Hypothesis because RK = R∗K ;
• ϕ = Bψϕ.
M∗, w∗ |= Bψϕ
iff Pl∗w(JψKw) = ⊥ or Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) > Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw)
iff JψKw ∩ RK(w) = ∅ or Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) > Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw) by Definition
8, item 2;
iff M, w |= K¬ψ or Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) > Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕK);
iff M, w |= K¬ψ or Pl∗w(Jψ ∧ ϕKw) ≥ Pl∗(Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKw) by Fact 14.
iff M, w |= K¬ψ or M, w |= 〈K〉(ψ ∧K(ψ → ϕ));
iff M, w |= 〈K〉ψ → 〈K〉(ψ ∧K(ψ → ϕ)) by Fact 15;
iff M, w |= Bψϕ by assumption on M.
Theorem 8. The conditional belief modality Bqp is explicitly defined in the
logic Lq := S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} by the formula defBqp := 〈K〉q →
〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p)) ∈ LK :
Bqp↔ (〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p))) ∈ Lq (Def Bqp)
Moreover, the following also holds:
S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} = S4.3K + {Bqp↔ defBqp} (4)
Proof. We split the proof of Expression (Def Bqp) into two parts. First, we
prove that defBqp → Bqp ∈ S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq4}. Second, we prove that
Bqp→ defBq ∈ S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq3, Iq5}.
1. Because of Lemma 13, this amounts to proving that for all pointed epis-
temic plausibility space (M, w) such that M, w |= S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq4},
we have that M, w |= defBqp → Bqp. Let (M, w) be such a pointed epistemic-
plausibility space and assume that M, w |= 〈K〉 q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p)). As-
sume towards a contradiction thatM, w 2 Bqp. Then, by definition, Plw(JqKw) 6=
⊥ and not Plw(Jq∧pKw) > Plw(Jq∧¬pK). Because Plw(JqKw) 6= ⊥, it holds that
M, w |= ¬Bq⊥. Now, because |= Bqq by C1, we have that |= Bq¬q → Bq⊥ by
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C2, i.e.M, w |= ¬Bq⊥ → ¬Bq¬q. Therefore,M, w |= ¬Bq¬q. So, by axiom Iq2,
M, w |= 〈K〉q. Then, by assumption, M, w |= 〈K〉 (q ∧K(q → p)). So, there
is v ∈ RK(w) such that M, v |= q ∧K (q → p). Therefore, M, v |= K(q → p),
and soM, v |= Bq(q → p) by application of the rule of necessitation and Axiom
Iq1. Hence, M, v |= Bqp, because |= Bqq. Now, M, w |= ¬Bqp, and therefore
M, w |= K (〈K〉q → ¬Bqp) by Iq4. So,M, v |= 〈K〉q → ¬Bqp. Since,M, v |= q,
we also have that M, v |= 〈K〉q. Therefore, M, w |= ¬Bqp which contradicts
our previous deduction. So, we reach a contradiction and therefore our initial
assumption was wrong. Hence, we have that M, w |= defBq → Bqp. This
holds for any pointed epistemic-plausibility space (M, w) such that M, w |=
S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq4}, so we have proved the first part.
2. Let (M, w) be a pointed epistemic-plausibility space. Assume that
M, w |= S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq3, Iq5} and that M, w |= Bqp. Assume towards a
contradiction thatM, w 2 defBqp, that is,M, w |= 〈K〉q∧K(q → 〈K〉(q∧¬p)).
Then, M, w |= Bq (q → 〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p)) by Iq1. So, M, w |= Bq〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p) be-
cause M, w |= Bqq and by distributivity of Bq. Therefore, M, w |= Bqp ∧
Bq〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p) because by assumption M, w |= Bqp. So, M, w |= BqK(q →
p) ∧ Bq〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p) by Iq3. Then, M, w |= Bq (K(q → p) ∧ 〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p)), again
by distributivity of Bq. Therefore, M, w |= Bq〈K〉(p ∧ ¬p). So, M, w |= Bq⊥.
Thus, by Iq5, we have that M, w |= K¬q, that is, M, w |= ¬〈K〉q. This
contradicts our assumption that M, w |= 〈K〉q. So, we reach a contradic-
tion and therefore our initial assumption was wrong. Hence, we have that
M, w |= Bqp → defBq . This holds for any pointed epistemic-plausibility space
(M, w) such that M, w |= S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq3, Iq5}, so we have proved the
second part by Lemma 13. Putting these two facts altogether, we obtain that
Bqp↔ defBq ∈ S4K +KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}. Hence, we obtain the definabil-
ity result.
We prove the second part of the theorem. To prove the left to right inclusion
of Expression (4), we must show that {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} ⊆ S4.3K + {Bqp ↔
(〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p)))}. Because of Lemma 13, this amounts to proving
that for all (qualitative) epistemic-plausibility spaces (M, w) ∈ SK such that
M, w |= S4.3K + {Bqp↔ defBqp} (∗) we have that M, w |= {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}.
By Lemma 16, this is equivalent to showing that for all (M, w) ∈ SK such that
(∗) holds, we have that M∗, w∗ |= {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}. We only deal with the
cases Iq4 and I
q
5, the other cases being rather straightforward by definition of
M∗. We first prove that for all (M, w) ∈ SK such that (∗) holds, we have
that M∗, w∗ |= Iq4. Assume that M∗, w∗ |= ¬Bqp. Let v∗ ∈ R∗K(w∗) and
assume that M∗, v∗ |= 〈K〉q. Then, we must show that M∗, v∗ |= ¬Bqp, i.e.
M∗, v∗ |= 〈K〉q∧K(q → 〈K〉(q∧¬p)) because of (∗), the rule of necessitation and
Lemma 16. We already know that M∗, v∗ |= 〈K〉q. Now, because M∗, w∗ |=
¬Bqp, we have that M∗, w∗ |= 〈K〉q ∧ K(q → 〈K〉(q ∧ ¬p)), and therefore
M∗, w∗ |= K(q → 〈K〉(q∧¬p)). Hence,M∗, v∗ |= K(q → 〈K〉(q∧¬p)) because
v∗ ∈ R∗K(w∗). This proves that M∗, w∗ |= Iq4. Finally, we prove the last case,
namely that for all (M, w) ∈ SK , M∗, w∗ |= Iq5. Assume that M∗, w∗ |= 〈K〉q.
We must prove thatM∗, w∗ |= ¬Bq⊥. That is, by the truth conditions of Bq, we
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must prove that it is not the case that Pl∗w(Jq∧⊥Kw) > Pl∗w(Jq∧>Kw), because
Pl∗w(JqKw) 6= ⊥ since M∗, w∗ |= 〈K〉q. But Pl∗w(Jq ∧ ⊥Kw) = Pl∗w(∅) = ⊥
by Condition 2 of Definition 8. Because it is impossible that for some d ∈ D
we have that ⊥ > d, we obtain our result. Second, we prove the right to left
inclusion of Expression (4). For this, we must show that .3 ∈ Lq := S4K+KBq +
{Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5} because we already proved in the first part of the theorem that
Bqp ↔ (〈K〉q → 〈K〉 (q ∧K (q → p))) ∈ Lq := S4K + KBq + {Iq1, Iq2, Iq3, Iq4, Iq5}.
This result is already proved in [3]. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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